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Social Connections, Reference Point and Acquisition Premium 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of acquirer-target social connections along with the target 52-week 
high (Baker, Pan, & Wurgler, 2012) on acquisition premiums. We show that acquisition premium is 
more sensitive to first-degree connection than the reference point, suggesting that information is the 
main driving force for determining acquisition premiums. The findings also indicate that connected 
directors are more likely to favour firms where they hold higher positions and negotiate favourable 
premiums. Acquirers pay lower premiums when target directors are retained in the new entity. 
Connected acquirers are also more likely to finance their deals with equity. Overall, this paper 
provides support to the information flow hypothesis that acquirers with social connections have better 
access to target information and enhanced bargaining power in negotiations.  
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1. Introduction 
Social network studies have attracted considerable interest from researchers. A growing body 
of literature has introduced social network theory into M&A studies and explored the impact 
of social connection on takeover outcomes. These studies emphasise the social ties between 
acquirers and targets but find mixed results in terms of the effects of social connection. On 
the one hand, acquirers with a social connection would benefit from the information 
advantage and be better able to determine the target’s true value, therefore enhancing their 
bargaining power in negotiation and paying a lower premium for the target (Cai & Sevilir, 
2012; Mol, 2001; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Schoorman, Bazerman, & Atkin, 1981). On the 
other hand, social connection could raise issues (Ishii & Xuan, 2014) such as over-trust, 
familiarity bias (Cao et al., 2009), social conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and 
overconfidence of acquirer management (Roll, 1986), therefore increasing the likelihood of 
overpayment and leading to inefficient and unprofitable transactions.1  
Motivated by the conflicting results, we re-examine the social links between acquirers and 
targets and provide further evidence for the role of social connection in the takeover process. 
Specifically, this study concentrates on the relationship between acquirer-target connection 
and acquisition premium by incorporating the target’s 52-week reference point. Acquisition 
premium is defined as offer price, as the log percentage difference from the target's share 
price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012). Previous studies 
indicate that a premium is not only an important measurement for the market to evaluate 
takeover transactions for bidders and targets but also strongly influences merging firms’ 
financial situations and post-acquisition performance in the short and even the long term 
(Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013; Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, & Travlos, 2012; 
Ayers, Lefanowicz, & Robinson, 2003; Holmén, Nivorozhkin, & Rana, 2014; Schwert, 1996). 
More importantly, among the indicators of takeover outcomes, acquisition premium is directly and 
largely affected by connection, since premiums best reflects the information advantage and 
                                                     
1 Familiarity bias describes the observation that individuals prefer familiar choices or decisions, avoiding any changes from the status quo 
(Cao et al., 2009). Social conformity refers to the bias that individuals are likely to follow the opinions of their peers instead of pursuing 
their own personal beliefs (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). This leads to inefficient negotiations between acquirer and target, in which the 
respective shareholders’ interest is not properly represented. 
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bargaining power in the negotiations between acquirers and their targets. Hence, analysing 
premiums could better verify the information hypothesis of social network studies. 
This paper introduces a psychological reference point (Baker et al., 2012) to examine what 
plays a determining role in target valuation and bid premium. According to Baker et al. (2012), 
acquisition partners are highly affected by the anchoring effect in pricing targets and 
negotiating premium. 52-week high price represents the recent peak price achieved by a firm 
in the past 52 weeks (Baker et al., 2012). The 52-week high is easily obtained and widely 
cited as firm valuation measure in the financial media and management reports. Both 
acquirers and targets regard a target’s 52-week high as a psychological reference point for 
target valuation and rely heavily on this psychological anchor when negotiating their offer 
premium.2 A higher target 52-week high implies a higher bid premium. Such a significant 
and positive relationship has been widely confirmed by recent studies (Alexandridis et al., 
2013; Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, & Thorburn, 2014). By involving reference point theory 
(Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework, this study establishes a more 
appropriate research framework to investigate whether acquisition premium is more affected 
by the acquirer’s social network or a psychological anchor. In this paper, we adopt two types 
of cross-firm connections based on the BoardEx database: first-degree and second-degree 
connections. A first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a board director or 
executive serves on both acquiring and target firm boards prior to the deal announcement, 
while a second-degree connection happens when two individuals, respectively from the 
acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as employment history 
or educational background)3. First-degree connection links bidders with targets via the same 
individual director, while second-degree connection involves two directors and connects 
merging parties via the third firm. Therefore, a first-degree connection is a more direct and 
closer relation between acquirers and targets than a second-degree connection. Hence, 
information obtained through a first-degree connection is more comprehensive and accurate, 
resulting in more precise valuation. Moreover, first-degree connections could better smooth 
                                                     
2 The target 52-week high is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days to 30 days before the takeover 
announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of the target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement (Baker et al., 
2012). 
3 BoardEx considers different relationship types. Possible routes are classified as follows: Quoted, Non-Quoted, Not for Profit, Education 
and Other. The latter contains connections that cannot be distinguished in any other allocations, for instance military service. Thus, such a 
connection could be non-professional or, rather, not business related. 
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the information exchange and communication between merging parties, leading to greater 
bargaining power and stronger impact in the negotiation of premium. 
We empirically test the impact of social connection by using a sample of 1,502 US M&A 
deals between 2001 and 2016, out of which 15.18% are connected either by first- or second-
degree connections. We find that the existence of social connection reduces premium by 6.53% 
relative to non-connected transactions. In first-degree connected deals, acquiring firms pay 
on average 11.33% less premium than in takeovers with no connection. The findings provide 
evidence that bidders could benefit from social connection by being better able to estimate 
targets’ true value and improve their own bargaining power, therefore paying lower 
acquisition premiums. In particular, this information advantage is strengthened for bidders 
with a first-degree connection, since acquirers would have better communication during 
negotiation, helping them secure a much lower and more favourable offer premium. 
We further control for the reference point – target 52-week high – in the premium analysis. 
According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is positively related with bid premium. 
We divide the full sample into three groups based on the target 52-week reference point. 
Compared with the premiums paid in non-connected deals, connected acquirers pay 2.94% 
less within the group of low target 52-week reference points and 10.61% less within the group 
of high 52-week reference points. This indicates that connected acquirers are less affected by 
the target’s 52-week reference point. The greater influence of first-degree connection than 
reference point is supported by the multivariate analysis. In particular, we observe that first-
degree connections are negatively related to premiums, while we find no significant relation 
between target 52-week reference point and premiums after controlling for year and industry 
fixed effects. The results indicate that first-degree connection has a stronger effect than target 
reference point in determining the amount of premium. The findings indicate that connected 
acquirer bargaining power is substantially increased, such that merging firms ignore the 
reference point when valuing the target during negotiation. Therefore, information advantage, 
rather than reference point, is the main determinant of the acquisition premium in deals with 
a first-degree connection. 
For robustness reasons, we focus solely on the CEO dimension. We examine cases where the 
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CEO himself/herself connects the two merging firms. Based on this definition, CEO 
connections are subdivided into CEO first-degree connections and CEO second-degree 
connections. We find that CEO connections significantly reduce the premium paid by 
acquirers by 12.50% in general and by 15.25% in first-degree connected deals respectively. 
The finding can be attributed to more accurate information provided by target CEOs and their 
powerful role in decision-making. 
In addition, we explore incentives of why connected directors favour acquirers over targets. 
We find that acquirers pay a lower premium when retaining directors who link acquirers and 
targets. In first-degree connected deals, the retention of connected directors leads to 
significantly lower premium (13.17%). All the interlocking directors in this sample were offered 
directorship roles/positions in the new/merged firm. In second-degree connected deals, acquirers 
that retain connected directors pay 6.26% lower premium than firms that offer no board seats. 
These connected directors obtain more benefit and power from acquiring firms, working in 
the best interests of acquirers and resulting in lower premium. In addition, acquisitions in which 
connected directors hold equivalent level positions in both the bidder and the target firm 
(48.48%) are associated with average 28.20% premium, significantly lower than the 46.94% 
premium in deals where the director holds a higher position in the target. Therefore, 
connected directors have self-incentive to assist in the completion of takeover deals and 
remain in the combined firm. In deals with second-degree connection, acquirers that recruit 
connected target directors to the new board are more likely to pay lower premium, since a 
board seat in the combined firm is secured. Hence, target connected directors have strong 
self-incentive to accelerate the acquisition process and compromise on lower acquisition 
premium, resulting in deviation from target shareholders’ interest.  
Finally, we examine the impact of connections on the medium of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. Bidders in connected transactions are prone to finance acquisition with their 
overvalued stock. Due to information asymmetry, targets’ shareholders run the risk of 
accepting bidders’ overvalued equity. Connections between bidders and targets can increase 
trust and information flow; therefore, targets’ shareholders can better value bidder stock, 
leading to a higher likelihood of equity payments. 
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 We contribute to the current literature in several ways. First, we add to the existing body of 
literature by taking into account the social ties between acquirers and targets. We provide 
evidence that the measurement of target value not only depends on the firm’s previous stock, 
operating and financial situation, but is also largely affected by the invisible social relations 
between acquirers and targets. In addition to Cai and Sevilir (2012), who provide similar 
evidence, we introduce the target 52-week high as a reference point for the existing 
framework. To our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate reference point theory (Baker 
et al., 2012) in premium analysis. According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is an 
important reference point for both acquirers and targets to price the target during negotiation. 
On the one hand, we verify a positive relation between target 52-week high and acquisition 
premium. On the other hand, we find that in first-degree connected deals, acquisition 
premium is not affected by the target 52-week high and is substantially decreased by the 
existence of a first-degree connection. That is, information advantage in first-degree 
connections significantly enhances acquirers’ bargaining power and generates a much greater 
influence on the offer premium than reference point. Information is the main determinant of 
acquisition premium, rather than target 52-week high. We verify the information hypothesis 
in cross-firm connections, while previous studies draw ambivalent conclusions regarding the 
impact of social connections on takeover activities. 
Another contribution relates to the method of payment. Few studies consider the impact of 
social connection on the choice of takeover timing and payment method. In addition to 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan's (2005) theoretical explanation of why targets 
accept bidders’ overvalued equity, we show that a close bidder-target relationship plays an 
important role in explaining this fact. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) use a UK sample and 
demonstrate that connected deals are more likely to be paid with stock, attributed to the board 
effect. We employ a US sample and enrich the view by analysing the pre-announcement stock 
performance of both acquirers and targets.  
We further contribute to studies on corporate governance and directorship. Unlike Renneboog 
and Zhao (2014), who find that target directors that are connected with bidder directors are 
more likely to be invited to participate in the new board, we show that this has a further 
impact on determining acquisitions premium. We provide new evidence that first-degree 
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connected directors offer a lower premium if they hold more senior positions in the acquiring 
firms. In second-degree connected deals, a lower premium is offered to target firms if the 
target director is retained in the new board of the merged entity.  We support previous findings 
(Harford, 2003; Wang, Sakr, Ning, & Davidson, 2010) that target directors would prioritise 
their own interests and compromise on acquisition premium at the cost of target shareholders’ 
interests in order to obtain directorship in combined firms.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 presents 
the development of our hypotheses. In Section 4 we describe our data and methodological 
approach. Section 5 connects our empirical results with our hypotheses and draws the first 
interpretation of our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and summarises our research. 
2. Literature review 
The main characteristic of social ties is that connection enables the flow of resources through 
a given network of individuals (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Information is among the most 
important resources in the business world, since individuals and companies suffer from 
information asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In other words, it is a fact that one entity 
has more information than another.  
Recent studies on social networks indicate that social connections have both a positive and a 
negative impact on corporate performance and investment decisions. A considerable number 
of studies confirm the existence of information advantage in social networks. For example, 
Uzzi (1999) suggests that firms that are socially linked with middle-market banking have a 
lower cost of capital than those without a social connection. Engelberg, Gao and Parsons 
(2012) find that commercial banks deliver more favourable financing terms to connected 
firms due to the improved information and monitoring arising from that connection, including 
a lower interest rate, higher credit rating and better stock performance. Cai and Sevilir (2012) 
address the board connection between acquiring firms and target firms and investigate its 
impact on acquisition performance. The findings show that social connection significantly 
increases the announcement return for acquirers and the combined entity. Moreover, bidders 
with a first-degree connection pay a lower acquisition premium and transaction cost, 
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measured by total investment bank fees. Second-degree connection improves the operating 
performance of combined firms in the long run. The results confirm the information 
advantage hypothesis in M&A studies. However, Cai and Sevilir (2012) do not explain why 
connections between bidders and targets only benefit bidding firms. One therefore asks, if 
only acquirers benefit from board connections, why are target firms willing to accept less 
favourable deal items? 
However, Ishii and Xuan (2014) show that social connection has a negative effect on takeover 
activities due to issues of over-trust, familiarity bias and social conformity. Social connection 
via an individual network builds trust beyond single business transactions and last longer. 
Yet, over-trust leads to inefficient decision-making, resulting in inferior firm performance. 
Additionally, management (senior executives or directors) may over-trust the information 
they obtain through their personal network and overestimate the information quality as well 
as their power of control. Therefore, social connection may lead to the CEO hubris problem 
(Roll, 1986) and therefore negatively affect deal outcomes. Moreover, social connection may 
raise the issue of familiarity bias, which refers to a situation where individuals prefer to 
maintain the status quo and select familiar firms in their investment decisions. Therefore, 
firm management with social connections may prioritise familiar partners and neglect better 
business opportunities beyond their individual networks, resulting in less favourable 
investment decisions. Another issue raised in social connections is social conformity, which 
implies that individuals prefer to follow the decisions of the group rather than put forward 
their personal opinions (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Similarly, social conformity may lead 
to inefficient decision-making and poor firm performance.  
3. Hypotheses Development 
In this section we develop our hypotheses based on the main theory of social networks, 
psychological reference point theory and M&A studies. 
According to Baker et al. (2012), both acquiring and target firms regard the target 52-week 
high as a reference for the premium paid or received in the negotiation. In general, the 
settlement of takeover deals should be approved by target shareholders, management and 
10 
 
bidding firms. For the majority of target shareholders, calculating firm valuation is a complex 
and time-consuming task, which requires much information and accurate forecast of targets. 
Therefore, target shareholders would often search for easily available benchmarks for pricing 
targets. The target 52-week high is the recent peak price that a target firm achieved before 
takeover announcement, which may be attained or exceeded in the future. Target 52-week 
high is easily obtained and widely cited in the financial media, and therefore can be used as 
a reference point for target valuation. For target management, using target 52-week high price 
as a negotiation anchor would save time and effort in estimating firm valuation and 
communicating with shareholders. For acquiring firms, information shortage makes it more 
difficult to value and negotiate with target firms. Therefore, acquirers are likely to anchor 
target recent peak price in order to settle M&A transactions. 
However, social connection could alter the target valuation and negotiation for acquisition 
partners. The presence of inter-firm connection facilitates information transfer and exchange 
via individual networks, thus reducing the information asymmetry between firms (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). In M&A deals, social connection, especially first-degree connection, brings a 
large information advantage to acquiring firms. Connected acquirers have better access (Mol, 
2001) to the target’s information, which is more detailed, accurate and current than the target 
52-week high to value the target firm.4 If information is the main driver of lower premiums 
paid to target firms, closely connected bidders should pay lower premiums. Moreover, 
bidder-acquirer connection greatly improves acquirers’ bargaining power (Cai & Sevilir, 
2012; Schoorman et al., 1981) and weakens the effect of target reference point on premiums. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that:  
H1: After controlling for the 52-week high reference point, first-degree connected bidders 
pay lower premiums than non-connected bidders. 
 
Baker et al. (2012) introduce the psychological phenomenon of “anchoring-and-adjustment” 
                                                     
4 By definition, 52-week high is the peak price that the target reached at least one month before acquisition. Target valuation at takeover 
announcement may derive from the peak price. Therefore, target value estimated on the basis of peak price (target 52-week high) may not 
be accurate. 
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to explain the process of target pricing. “Anchoring-and-adjustment” suggest that individuals 
would select a preliminary estimate as an anchor (reference point), and then adjust towards 
the final decision or true value (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
In mergers and acquisitions, the peak price achieved by targets in the last 52 weeks is 
regarded as the anchor or reference point of target valuation. Acquirers would base their offer 
price on the reference point and make subsequent adjustments according to information and 
negotiation. Acquirer-target connection, especially first-degree connection, reduces 
information asymmetry and improves the bargaining power in the negotiation. Therefore, the 
existence of social connection positively affects the adjustment of bidding premium. 
 
According to Baker et al. (2012), by anchoring high reference points (peak price of target 
firms), bidders are more likely to pay a higher premium and more likely to deviate from 
target’s true value. However, lower target 52-week high represents a smaller difference 
between peak price in the last 52 weeks and recent share price. Anchoring low quantile of 
targets’ 52-week high for premium is associated with low premiums. In the adjustment 
process, acquirers would revise their offer price towards the true value of target firms. 
Acquirers with first-degree connection have better access to target true value and better 
bargaining power in the negotiation, and therefore pay lower offer price in deals with higher 
target reference points. The adjustment in first-degree connected deals is larger and more 
sufficient when the target reference point is high. It is in this regime that the anchoring 
behavioural bias is more pronounced and the information advantage emanating from 
connections helps bidders adjust their valuation accordingly and pay relatively lower 
premiums. The adjustment effect of close connection is lower in the low quantile of reference 
points, as the anchoring effect is less pronounced. The additional information brought by 
connection may have less of an influence in reducing premiums. Therefore, we expect that: 
H2: The lower premiums paid by connected bidders should be more pronounced when the 
target 52-week reference point is high. 
 
Previous literature indicates that overlapping directors facilitate information transfer and 
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smooth communication between connected firms (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Salancik 
& Pfeffer, 1978). However, the contribution of resources and experience is highly affected 
by the organisation identification (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2006; Shropshire, 
2010). Organisational identification, a concept in management studies, refers to how 
employees identify with or understand firms, and therefore affects employees’ contribution 
to their work. Directors who hold positions on multiple boards have stronger organisational 
identification in the firms where they work as CEO/Chair. Therefore, interlocking directors 
would favour those firms and contribute more advice as well as knowledge to the organisation 
where they serve as CEO/Chair and have stronger organisational identification. Moreover, 
the position of CEO/Chair could bring more financial and non-financial benefit as well as 
power to interlocking CEOs. Hence, interlocking directors would act in the interest of firms 
where they hold higher and more important positions. Therefore, we expect that: 
H3: Connected directors/executives are more likely to favour firms where they hold a higher 
position and negotiate favourable premiums.  
 
Target directors are more likely to accept a lower premium in exchange for directorship in 
newly merged firms (Wang et al., 2010). Board seats in newly merged firms would signal the 
high quality and expertise of directors and bring more job opportunities, resources and 
network to the director (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Harford, 2003; Wang et al., 2010). 
Therefore, target directors may sacrifice shareholders’ interest and compromise on premiums 
in order to remain on the new board. Moreover, if acquirers and targets successfully merge, 
target firms may not exist in the future. Retained directors who previously worked in targets 
are responsible for representing the interests of “future” shareholders in the combined firms. 
Hence, target directors with a higher likelihood of being retained are more likely to approve 
deals with a lower premium. 
Furthermore, acquiring firms are willing to retain connected target directors (or senior 
executives) in newly merged firms. Previous literature finds that firms are willing to bring a 
“friend” or “someone they know” into the business due to the familiarity effect (Chen, Levy, 
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Martin, & Shalev, 2014; Cooney, Madureira, Singh, & Yang, 2015). To maintain a long-term 
relationship, “friends” may take into account the interests of their partners (Cohen, Frazzini, 
& Malloy, 2008; Cooney et al., 2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). Moreover, target 
directors (or senior executives) who are linked with acquiring firms via personal network 
have better acknowledgement of targets and acquirers and therefore could accelerate the post-
merger integration process (Li & Aguilera, 2008). Therefore, acquirers tend to retain target 
directors with whom they have a social connection. Overall, we expect that:  
H4: Acquirers pay a lower premium when connected target directors/executives are retained 
in the newly merged firms.  
 
CEOs play a more powerful and essential role in boards (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; L. A. 
Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015). L. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
propose a managerial power theory and indicate that CEOs dominate boards and have more 
bargaining power in negotiations, especially in matters of CEO compensation. The dominant 
role of managerial power could be attributed to the fact that board directors lack incentives 
to serve shareholders’ interests. On the one hand, the selection of board members may be 
affected or controlled by CEOs (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Rosenstein, 1987; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). On the other hand, directors may compromise in exchange for financial benefit 
and business opportunities provided by CEOs. Moreover, directors would avoid conflicts 
with CEOs for social and physiological reasons, such as collegiality and friendship (L. 
Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
CEOs have more accurate information than boards and are responsible for day-to-day 
operation and management activities. CEOs have superior information of their firm’s state of 
operation and financial situation (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Boards serve in advising 
and monitoring management and corporate performance. Directors are not directly involved 
in daily operations (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Board directors make decisions based on the 
information provided by management, and at times information transfers insufficiently 
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between CEOs and board. 
Therefore, connection with CEOs is more valuable and efficient than connection with boards. 
Acquirers linked with target CEOs have greater information advantage and suffer less 
resistance from target firms. Acquirer CEOs who also sit on the target board would favour 
acquirers and negotiate lower premiums because they have more to gain in bidding firms. 
Hence, we expect that: 
H5: Acquirers with CEO connection, especially CEO first-degree connection, pay lower 
premiums than acquirers with board connection. 
 
Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) examine public takeover deals and find that 
acquirers are more likely to use cash deals when facing a greater extent of two-sided 
information asymmetry. Social connection, especially first-degree connection, reduces 
information asymmetry and improves the bargaining power of acquirers during negotiation, 
therefore increasing the likelihood of stock payments. The probability of deal completion 
affects acquirers’ choice of payment method. Cash offers may signal the high valuation of 
targets and therefore could deter the potential rivals of bidding firms, leading to a higher 
probability of successful deals. For public acquirers, the prevention of competing bids 
outweighs the expected cost in information asymmetry. Connected acquirers have better 
access to target information and therefore better acknowledge the intrinsic value and 
operational and financial situation of target firms, as well as the bidder itself. Cai and Sevilir 
(2012) indicate that acquirers that are linked with targets are less likely to be involved in 
competing bid. Therefore, acquirers are more likely to use stock to pay for deals in socially 
connected deals. 
Generally, in stock offers, targets are uncertain of acquirers’ true stock valuation. Equity 
payment implies the overvaluation of bidding firms (Chang, 1998; Huang & Walkling, 1987; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2009; Travlos, 1987). Targets would only accept equity payment 
when the stock offer exceeds the true value of target firms. Hence, acquirers take longer to 
negotiate and complete deals when the payment is made partly or entirely with stocks 
15 
 
(Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). Acquirer-target connection increases the trust and 
bargaining power between two parties. Targets in socially connected deals have better access 
to valuation of bidders’ stock, increasing the likelihood of accepting equity payments. 
Moreover, in stock offers, a target’s board of directors could exchange the shares of target 
firms for the shares of bidding and increase their voting power in the newly merged firms 
(Ghosh & Ruland, 1998). Therefore, a target’s board would favour stock payment if they 
desire to maintain their influence in the new board. Additionally, target boards may face tax 
obligations when a deal is paid with cash (Travlos, 1987; Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 1983). 
Connected directors who previously worked in the target are more likely to be retained by 
the combined firms due to the familiarity effect (Chen et al., 2014; Cooney et al., 2015). 
Therefore, connected target directors tend to discourage cash offers due to personal interest. 
Therefore, we expect that: 
H6: Acquirers in connected deals are more likely to finance acquisitions with stock. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. Data and selection criteria 
The data for our analysis is gathered from different sources. We collect US takeover deal 
information over the period from 1st January 2001 to 31st December 2016 from the Thomson 
One database. The timeframe was selected to match the growing data availability of BoardEx, 
which started in 1999. 5  The original sample contains 140,418 deals. Because of the 
availability of information, we focus only on public transactions where both acquirer and 
target are quoted, leaving 4,750 observations. Moreover, we only include deals of at least $10 
million, resulting in 3,809 deals. We only consider takeovers with a transfer of control. 
Specifically, we select transactions in which the acquirer obtained more than 50% ownership 
of the target, leaving 2,528 takeover bids. We drop another 1,026 observations where 
information is not available in the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. Finally, we obtain a 
                                                     
5 The BoardEx database is widely used when analysing social connections in a business context. Other studies using BoardEx include 
Engelberg et al. (2012) and Ishii and Xuan (2014). However, both studies automatically retrieve the data. We, on the other hand, manually 
check every cross-firm connection.  
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full sample of 1,502 M&A deals. 
For the identification of social connections between acquirer and target companies, we access 
relationship data from BoardEx. These data were collected and linked manually using the 
Point-to-Point tool for each M&A deal.6 If more than one company was listed with the same 
or a similar name, we hand-checked and compared the data by utilising our previously 
computed market values to identify the appropriate company. The classification of social 
connections is based on the BoardEx data. Connection includes both first-degree and second-
degree connections. A first-degree connection classifies a CEO or board member that serves 
on both the acquirer’s and the target’s boards at the time of the deal announcement.7 A 
second-degree connection represents a social tie at board level between two individuals 
respectively from the acquirer and target firms. For second-degree connections we allow any 
possible connection between two peers, including employment history and educational 
background. 
We split the full sample into two subgroups: 228 deals with a social connection and 1,274 
deals with no connection. We categorise the connected deals into 66 first-degree connected 
deals and 162 second-degree connected deals, in which only second-degree connected 
transactions are included.  Furthermore, we reclassify the socially connected deals into 106 
CEO-connected deals, in which either acquirer or target CEO links the bidding and target 
firms, and 122 board-connected deals, in which a board member is the connection between 
merging firms. Specifically, CEO-connected deals include 45 first-degree CEO-connected 
deals, where the CEO in the bidding or target firm serves as an executive, and 61 second-
degree CEO-connected deals, in which acquirer or target CEOs share past experience with 
board members or executives in other merging firms. Likewise, deals with board connection 
consist of 21 first-degree board-connected deals, in which acquirer board members also serve 
on the target’s board, and 101 second-degree board-connected deals, in which acquirer board 
members have social ties with target board members. 
                                                     
6 BoardEx’s Point-to-Point tool allows us to manually control for connections between two companies. It has the advantage that we can 
personally select the companies’ names. 
7 Herein, board member does not include CEO. 
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4.2. The sample 
The sample consists of 1,502 M&A deals. Table 1 illustrates the number of M&A deals by 
year and industry of the acquirers. We classify deals into two main groups for our research, 
namely connected and non-connected deals. The connected subsample represents all M&A 
deals where we successfully identify a first- or second-degree connection. Otherwise, the 
deal is specified as non-connected. In general, the large number of M&A deals is distributed 
over the period from 2003 to 2006 and from 2014 to 2016, during which sixth (Alexandridis 
et al., 2012) and seventh merger waves (Mavis et al., 2016) occur.8 Starting from 2014, the 
number and value of M&A transactions substantially increases in the US market. The highest 
proportion of connected deals falls within 2013 to 2016. The connected deals announced in 
2013 to 2016 mainly occur in the finance industry and business equipment industry.  
The industry classification is based on the acquirer’s industry, according to the Fama-French 
12-industry classification. It is evident that Finance and Business Equipment companies 
initiate most of the deals, together representing 58.39% of our entire sample. This pattern is 
also evident for our connected deals, where both industries account for 48.25% of all 
connected deals. Further, we observe that some industries only contain a few connected deals, 
for instance Consumer Durables or Consumer Non-Durables. To control for this inequality, 
we employ industry fixed effects in our multivariate analysis. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for firm and deal characteristics. An explicit definition 
and the source for each reported variable is reported in Appendix A. Additionally, we conduct 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to analyse whether the differences between our sub-groups are 
statically significant. In general, we observe significant differences between connected and 
non-connected deals. The acquirers in connected deals have higher Tobin’s Q, higher market 
values (MV) and greater returns on assets (ROA), implying that those companies have higher 
market valuation and outperform their peers in terms of profitability. Interestingly, we 
observe that connected targets have higher market value but lower Tobin’s Q. In general, 
                                                     
8 Following Harford (2003), Mavis et al. (2016) identify the emergence of a seventh merger wave in banking, healthcare, real estate and 
trading, etc. industries over the period from 2011 to 2013. 
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acquirers have higher Tobin’s Q than targets, implying that acquirers are relatively 
overvalued compared to targets (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006). The 
difference of Tobin’s Q is larger between acquirers and targets in deals where merging parties 
are socially linked, which implies that the extent of misevaluation is more salient in 
connected deals.9  
Due to the larger size of connected target firms, connected deals are substantially higher in 
terms of transaction value and relative deal size. All connected deals together represent 25.15% 
of the total transaction value of our sample. Interestingly, the average premium paid for 
connected targets is significantly lower (by 6.53%) compared to non-connected targets, while 
we do not observe a striking difference of target 52-week reference points between connected 
and non-connected deals. This is the first evidence supporting our first hypothesis, which 
states that connected bidders pay lower premium regardless of reference point. In addition, 
we find that connected deals are more frequently paid completely with stocks. The acquirers’ 
run up, an indicator of overvaluation, is higher in connected deals, implying that connected 
acquirers are likely to time their acquisitions and proceed when their stock is overvalued. 
According to Travlos (1987) and Dong et al. (2006), acquirers tend to pay target firms with 
overvalued stocks. This could explain the lower acquisition premium in connected deals, 
since connected acquirers might finance transactions with overvalued stocks. Therefore, we 
need to control for the method of payment in our multivariate analysis.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of all variables in this study. As expected, we observe 
the strong correlation between premium and first-degree connection as well as target 
reference point (Baker et al., 2012). In line with Officer (2003), premiums are positively 
associated with cash payment and negatively related with stock payment. Premiums are 
significantly increased in tender offers and deals involving multiple bidding firms (Edmister 
& Walkling, 1985; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; Officer, 2003). Furthermore, 
socially connected deals are more likely to be financed with acquirers’ equity. Larger-sized 
                                                     
9 In socially connected deals, Tobin’s Q is on average 4.05 for acquirers, and 2.69 for targets, where in non-connected deals, the average 
Tobin’s Q for acquirers and targets is 3.12 and 2.80, respectively.   
19 
 
bidders tend to select stocks as the medium of payment. Additionally, a positive relation is 
observed between stock payment and transaction value. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. The impact of social connections and target 52-week reference point on acquisition 
premiums 
5.1.1. Target 52-week high and acquisition premium 
In this section, we test the reliability of target 52-week high in affecting offer premium. 
Following Baker et al. (2012), we employ target peak price over various horizons (13 weeks, 
26 weeks, 39 weeks and 104 weeks prior to announcement date) as alternative target levels. 
Similar to target 52-week high, X-week high is calculated as the log percentage difference of 
the target’s X-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal 
announcement. Next, we use histograms to plot the density of the difference between offer 
price and target reference points (target 13-week high, 26-week high, 39-week high, 52-week 
high and 104-week high), following Baker et al. (2012). The red curve in each histogram 
below plots the normal distribution of the difference between offer premium and various 
target reference points. Except target 52-week high (histogram D), the average mean of 
normal distribution derives from zero. However, the offer premium centres on the target 52-
week high, implying that target 52-week high is more accurate and reliable in gauging offer 
premium than other target reference points. For that reason, we employ the 52-week high as 
the main reference point for the analysis of the paper. 
[Insert Figure1 About Here] 
 
5.1.2. Univariate analysis 
In this section, we undertake the univariate analysis and examine whether the relation 
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between social connection and premium would be affected by the value of target reference 
points. Table 4 reports average premiums paid in deals classified by target 52-week high and 
social connection. Specifically, we divide the full sample into three quantiles (low, medium, 
high), depending on the degree of log percentage difference between the 52-week high share 
price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. The high quantile 
represents a large gap between the target recent price (four weeks before announcement) and 
peak price during the past 52 weeks. According to reference point theory (Baker et al., 2012), 
acquiring firms in the high quantile would negotiate the offer price by anchoring higher target 
reference points and therefore tend to pay higher premiums, while bidders in the low quantile 
are expected to pay lower premiums. We further split the full sample into non-connected 
deals and connected deals (including first-degree and second-degree connected deals) and 
perform two-tailed t-test to examine the difference in premiums between pair-wise groups. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
In Table 4, we observe that the acquisition premium increases progressively from the low 
quantile to the high quantile, which supports the findings in Baker et al. (2012). For each 
quantile, connected deals have lower average premiums than non-connected deals. The 
difference in average premiums between connected deals (Column 2) and non-connected 
deals (Column 5) is -7.39% in the medium quantile and -10.61% in the high quantile, both 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However, we observe no significant 
difference in the low quantile. The findings support Hypothesis 2, which indicates that the 
social connection effect on premium is more pronounced when the target 52-week high price 
is high.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the premium paid in highly connected deals (first-degree 
connection; Column 3) is significantly less than the premium in non-connected deals 
(Column 5) in all quantiles of the target 52-week high. Moreover, acquirers pay lower 
premiums in first-degree connected deals (Column 3) than in deals with second-degree 
connection. The results above imply that inter-firm connection reduces acquisition premiums. 
The closer connection between acquirers and targets has a more negative impact, since 
acquirers gain greater information advantage in first-degree connected deals. 
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 Overall, the univariate analysis provides preliminary results and suggests that premiums are 
negatively affected by social connection. This negative effect does not seem to be affected 
by the target’s 52-week high reference point.  
5.1.3. Multivariate analysis 
We further proceed with multivariate premium analysis to test the robustness of the previous 
finding. In Table 5, we regress acquisition premium against connection dummy variables 
(including variables for connection, first-degree connection and second-degree connection) 
which equal one if acquirers and targets are socially connected, and zero otherwise. Moreover, 
we introduce the target 52-week high as a reference point to gauge the anchoring effect in 
negotiation of premiums. Following Baker et al. (2012), we compute the log percentage 
difference of targets’ 52-week high and target price four weeks before the announcement. We 
also include common variables of firm and deal characteristics in previous M&A studies, 
such as Tobin’s Q (Officer, 2003; Schwert, 2000), relative size of the deal (Moeller et al., 
2004), payment method, deal attitude (Schwert, 2000) and whether the bid involves multiple 
bidders (Walkling & Edmister, 1985). Additionally, we control both year and industry fixed 
effects in all models. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
In Models 1 and 2, social connection, especially first-degree connection, is significantly 
negatively associated with acquisition premium, suggesting that social linkage between 
merging parties could significantly reduce premiums. In particular, the coefficient for first-
degree connection is -0.4072 in Model 2, significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
The finding demonstrates that the existence of a first-degree connection reduces the 
acquisition premium. However, the relation between second-degree connection and premium 
is insignificant in all models. These findings are in accordance with Cai and Sevilir (2012), 
who suggest that targets in higher-connection deals obtain lower premiums. The results can 
be explained by the greater information advantage associated with first-degree connections. 
Having a close connection with a target means that acquirers benefit from more accurate 
target information and enhance their bargaining power in the negotiation process. 
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Consistent with Baker et al. (2012), we observe that the target 52-week high reference point 
is positively associated with the acquisition premium in Model 3. The findings confirm that 
higher target 52-week highs result in higher acquisition premiums paid to targets. The strong 
negative relation between premiums and connections, especially for first-degree connections, 
remains robust after controlling for the target 52-week high in Models 4 and 5. The 
coefficients of target 52-week high become insignificant in Models 4 and 5 with fixed effects 
included. The connection variables reduce the coefficient and significance level of target 52-
week high from significance (0.0386, significant at 1% in Model 3) to insignificance (0.0145 
in Model 4; 0.212 in Model 5). The findings support our hypothesis and indicate that social 
connection has stronger explanatory power than target reference point in premium analysis.  
The findings could be attributed to the information advantage in the connection, especially 
in first-degree connections. The target reference point is public information for acquirers; 
therefore, it reflects limited target information. A first-degree connection largely reduces the 
information asymmetry between acquirers and targets, resulting in acquirers better 
comprehending a target’s true value and having enhanced bargaining power in negotiations. 
Therefore, in connected deals, acquirers obtain more information about target valuation and 
could rely less on 52-week high to negotiate acquisition premium. Therefore, social 
connection, especially first-degree connection, outweighs the target reference point and plays 
a determining role in deciding premium. 
 
Moreover, the increase in relative deal size decreases acquisition premium, in line with 
Alexandridis et al. (2013).10 Premiums are higher in transactions financed with cash, tender 
offers (Schwert, 2000) or deals with lower target Tobin’s Q ratios (Bargeron, Schlingemann, 
Stulz, & Zutter, 2008). 
 
To further disentangle the effect between connections and the target 52-week reference point, 
in Table 6 we further split the full sample into three quantiles (low, medium, high) according 
to the target 52-week reference points. We analyse the relation between acquisition premium 
and social connection in the subsample of Low/High target 52-week high. In Model 1 and 
                                                     
10 The negative relation could be attributed to lower competition for large takeover transactions (Gorton et al., 2009), leading to less 
pronounced “winner’s curse” (Alexandridis et al., 2010) and a lower probability of overpayment to targets (Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
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Model 2, the dependent variable is the connection variable. In Model 3 and Model 4, 
acquisition premium is regressed against first-degree and second-degree connections.  
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
Generally, the relation between premium and connection, especially first-degree connection, 
is more negative and significant in the subsample of high target 52-week highs than in the 
group with low target 52-week highs. In Model 4, the coefficient for first-degree connection 
is -0.3937 in the high quantile, significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient in the low 
quantile is -0.5089 and statistically insignificant. As expected in the second hypothesis, first-
degree connection has more pronounced effects in deals with higher target 52-week high 
reference points. Higher target 52-week high represents a larger gap between peak price and 
recent price of target firms.11 Compared with low target 52-week highs, a high 52-week high 
is more likely to deviate from target true value, resulting in higher premiums paid. However, 
socially connected acquirers, particularly with a first-degree connection, could estimate firm 
value more accurately and negotiate a reasonable price due to their information advantage. 
Therefore, the negative impact of connection, particularly first-degree connection, is more 
pronounced in deals with a high reference point. 
5.2 Why do directors favour acquirers and why do targets accept lower premiums? 
The findings presented so far indicate that acquiring firms take over connected targets by 
paying lower premiums, especially when acquirers’ and targets’ boards share the same 
directors. According to agency theory, directors are recruited to represent shareholders’ 
interests and act as a monitoring device. While directors are in general influenced by the 
target 52-week high, in socially connected deals, managers are not as influenced by the 
reference point and accept significantly lower acquisition premiums. In this section, we 
explore why directors are more likely to favour acquirers and why target boards are willing 
to be acquired with a low offer premium, and we try to explain the incentive from the 
seniority and retention point of view. 
                                                     
11 Following Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is computed as the log percentage difference between 52-week high price, the recent 
peak price achieved by target firms, and target price at four weeks before the takeover announcement. 
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[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
5.2.1 Seniority impact on premium 
In Table 7, we provide the univariate and multivariate evidence on the seniority and retention 
of connected directors and investigate the impact on premium. We first examine the positions 
of connected directors in acquisition partners and classify interlocking directors’ board 
positions both in the acquirer and target firms (or connected directors in the second-degree 
connected deals, respectively from acquirers and targets) into the following categories: CEO, 
Chairman, independent director or common director.12. The first level includes the CEO and 
Chairman roles, while the second level includes the common directors and independent 
directors. Higher-level positions for acquirers (targets) indicate that the interlocking director 
holds a more important position in the acquirer (target) than in the target (acquirer). In our 
sample, 14.91% of connected directors hold higher positions and have more power in 
acquiring firms than in targets, while 66.67% of connected directors have the same level of 
board position in acquirers and targets. In first-degree connected deals, 33.33% of 
interlocking directors hold more important positions in acquirers, while 48.48% of 
interlocking directors are in positions at the same level.  
Panel A lists the average premium in transactions classified by the seniority of connected 
directors. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the difference in average premiums 
between pair-wise groups. In general, acquirers pay significantly lower premium when 
connected directors hold the same level or a more important position in bidding firms, 
especially when acquirers and targets share interlocking directors. In first-degree connected 
deals, the acquisition premium is on average 13.17% when the director holds a higher and 
more powerful position in acquirers, while acquisition premium is 46.94% when directors 
hold a higher-level board seat in the target, indicating that directors favour firms in which 
they dominate. Acquisition premium is on average 28.20% in takeover deals in which 
directors hold positions at the same level as in acquisition partners, indicating that directors are 
prone to protecting acquirers’ interests. In Panel C of Table 7, the first four models regress 
                                                     
12 In first-degree connected deals, board members who serve on both acquirer and target boards are called “interlocking directors”. 
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premium on the independent variables related to seniority.13 The coefficients of A_higher 
position are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that premium 
would be largely reduced when connected directors hold a higher position in acquirers. The 
results of multivariate analysis support the seniority hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). The findings 
could be explained by interlocking directors having stronger organisational identification in 
firms where the hold higher-level positions and therefore would contribute more important 
resources and valuable advice to the firms (Hillman et al., 2006; Shropshire, 2010). Therefore, 
interlocking directors who serve as CEO/Chairman in acquirers would favour bidding firms 
and negotiate lower premiums.  
5.2.2 Retention effect on premium 
Next, we investigate the retention of connected directors and its relation with premium. In 
first-degree connected deals, we find that all interlocking directors who serve in both acquirer 
and target firms continue to stay on the new board of combined firms after the acquisition, 
since interlocking directors have better understanding in both acquirers and targets and 
therefore could facilitate and accelerate the post-merger integration process (Li & Aguilera, 
2008). In second-degree connected deals, target directors share experience (education, 
employment, etc.) with acquirer directors. In general, target directors are not likely to could 
continue to serve on the new board after takeovers are completed (Harford, 2003). However, 
in second-degree connected deals, 33.33% of target connected directors are retained on the 
board of the combined firm following takeover deals, implying that social connections with 
the acquirer’s board plays an essential role in target directors’ staying or leaving.  
Panel B of Table 7 shows that acquirers that retain target connected directors pay lower 
acquisition premium (30.12%). 14  In second-degree connected deals, retention of target 
directors would reduce premium by 6.26% on average. These findings are in line with retention 
hypothesis, in which bidding firms pay lower premiums when retaining connected target 
directors. The conclusion is further supported by Model 5 and Model 6 in Panel C of Table 
7. We observe a strong and negative relation between premium and the retention variable. 
                                                     
13 A_higher position refers to a  situation where connected directors hold a higher-level position in bidding firms, while A_T same level 
position refers to connected directors in acquirers who serve in the same level positions as in target firms. 
14 In first-degree connected deals, all the interlocking directors are retained in the newly combined firms. Therefore, we do not show the 
univariate analysis of premium for first-degree connected deals. 
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The results can be explained by the fact that target directors may put their interests before 
shareholders’. 
Harford (2003) documents that target boards would resist takeover bids or charge high 
acquisition premiums to compensate for their financial, information or network loss due to 
the loss of directorship. However, directors may compromise and neglect target shareholders’ 
interest when their self-interest is satisfied. Similarly, Wang et al. (2010) provide evidence 
that target directors sacrifice shareholders’ interests and accept lower acquisition premiums 
in exchange for directorship in combined firms. Moving to the board of the new combined 
firm would signal directors’ high quality and expertise, resulting in more job opportunities. 
For retained directors, accepting low acquisition premiums can be regarded as protecting 
future shareholders’ interest. Additionally, social links with acquirers would increase the 
likelihood of retention for target directors due to the familiarity effect (Cohen, Frazzini, & 
Malloy, 2008; Cooney et al., 2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). Therefore, connected 
directors have more incentive to compromise on deal items in order to secure board seats and 
favour the interest of future shareholders.  
Taken together, retaining connected directors is associated with low acquisition premiums 
and confirms that connected board directors in target firms have a strong incentive to 
complete acquisition even at the cost of shareholders’ interest.  
5.3. Alternative Proxy for Social Connection 
El-Khatib et al. (2015) adopt CEO centrality to study the relation between acquisitions and 
within-firms’ social connection; they indicate that takeover activities are strongly influenced 
by CEO centrality.15  Therefore, we employ an alternative proxy between acquirers and 
targets as a robustness analysis for takeover premium. We reclassify the cross-firm 
connection into only CEO connections. Specifically, CEO connections refer to instances 
when acquirer or target CEOs act as a go-between for bidding firms and targets. CEO 
connections are further split into CEO first-degree connections, in which the acquirer (target) 
                                                     
15 CEOs with higher centrality negatively affect acquisition performance. CEO centrality qualifies the strength and importance of the 
CEO within top management in the aspects of performance, decision-making and dedication. Higher CEO centrality implies that the CEO 
plays a more essential and powerful role within the organisation. 
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CEO also works as a target (acquirer) board or management member. CEO connections are 
classified as second-degree if the acquirer or target CEO shares past experience with board 
members or executives in the counterpart firm. 
Table 8 reports the relation between acquisition premium and CEO connection, including 
first-degree and second-degree connections. We also introduce the reference point – target 
52-week high – in Model 2 and Model 4. In Model 5 and Model 6, we split the full sample 
into three quantiles (low, medium, high) and analyse the impact of CEO connection on 
acquisition premium in the subsample of low/high target 52-week highs. We control both 
year and industry fixed effects in all models.16 
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
We observe that the coefficient for CEO connection is -0.3117, significant at 5%, while the 
coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.5075, significant at 1% with target 52-week 
high controlled. The findings support the hypothesis of CEO connection and suggest that 
acquisition premium is strikingly reduced by CEO connection, especially first-degree 
connection. In Models 5 and 6, we find that the coefficients for the CEO connection variable 
are more significant when takeover deals are in the high quantile of target 52-week high. The 
coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.8295 (insignificant) in the subsample of low 
target 52-week highs, and is -1.0470 (significant at 1%) in the subsample of high target 52-
week highs. The results reveal that CEO connection, especially first-degree, is more 
pronounced in the high reference point subsample. This indicates that CEOs with connections, 
especially first-degree connections, are not anchored by the target’s reference point and 
indeed pay lower premiums. 
5.4. Method of Payment 
Previous findings indicate that acquirers could benefit from social connection, and their 
resulting higher information advantage, by paying lower premiums to targets. In this section, 
we further explore whether bidders could exploit this information advantage and the close 
relationships they have with target firms in other aspects. We investigate whether social 
                                                     
16 We also test all models without year and industry effects and find the same results; the results remain robust. 
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connection would have an effect on the method of payment.  
[Insert Table 9 About Here] 
In Table 9, we employ logit regressions to address the relation between social connection and 
medium of payment. The dependent variable is a stock dummy which is equal to one if deals 
are fully paid with stock. The explanatory variable includes connection (in Model 1 and 
Model 2), first-degree connection and second-degree connection (in Model 3 and Model 4 
respectively). The models also include the other control variables, year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects. 
 In general, all the models show striking relations between the medium of payment and 
variables representing connection. The coefficients for connection are positive and salient in 
Model 1 and Model 2, implying that bidders in connected deals are prone to finance bids with 
their own stock. In Model 4 with fixed effects controlled, stock deals are positively associated 
with first- and second-degree connections, significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the 
coefficients for first-degree connection (0.8662 in Model 4) are greater than those for second-
degree (0.7159 in Model 4), indicating that a closer connection has a bigger impact on the 
choice of payment medium. Therefore, acquirers with a first-degree connection tend to 
choose stock to pay for takeover activities. The findings are consistent with our hypothesis. 
Acquirers may choose equity as a payment method due to ownership structure and contingent 
effects. In stock offers, target shareholders are concerned with overvaluation of acquirers 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2009; Travlos, 1987). Bidding firms take longer to negotiate and 
complete transactions paid with stock (Golubov et al., 2012). Social connection between 
acquirers and targets, especially first-degree connection, reduces the two-sided information 
asymmetry, increases trust and enables target shareholders to accurately value bidders’ stocks. 
Therefore, targets are more likely to accept equity payment in socially connected deals. 
Moreover, target boards or management would accept stock offers in exchange for shares and 
voting power of combined firms. Connection with acquirers increases the likelihood of 
retention, therefore leading to a higher probability of acceptance of stock payment.  
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5.5 Robustness check 
5.5.1 Endogeneity test  
In this section, we employ the two-stage-least-square (2SLS) procedure to address possible 
endogeneity problems concerning bid premium. We select instrumental variables (IVs) that 
relate to the key connection variables but do not directly influence the error component in the 
models. The objective is to avoid correlation between independent variables and the residuals 
in OLS regressions. Specifically, the instrument is whether a social connection existed 
between acquirers and targets three years before the announcement. Since an M&A deal is 
usually not prepared three years in advance, the connection built three years before does not 
serve the purpose of acquisition. Therefore, we expect that this instrumental variable has no 
impact on our dependent variable (acquisition premium), but directly affects the connection 
variables. 
[Insert Table 10 About Here] 
We consider connections three years before the announcement as the instrumental variable 
for connection in previous OLS regressions, first-degree connection three years before for 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection three years before for second-degree 
connection. Table 10 shows both the first and second stages of the endogeneity test. 
Following Politis and Romano (1994), we apply the resampling technique – stationary 
bootstrap  to estimate standard errors and confidence intervals in order to address the potential 
issue of stationary and weakly dependent observations. The observations are resampled in 
the block of random length, where the length of each block is distributed with a geometric 
distribution with mean b. We control year and industry fixed effects in all models. In Model 
2 and Model 4, we also include target 52-week high. The endogeneity results lead to similar 
conclusions as in previous sections. We still find a negative impact of social connection, 
especially first-degree connection, on acquisition premium. The coefficient for first-degree 
connection is negative and statistically significant at 1%, even with target 52-week high 
controlled in Model 4. Moreover, we proceed with the Hausman test to further check for the 
endogeneity when the independent variable is connection (any connection), first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that 
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the connection variable is exogenous. The p-value of the Hausman test is 0.5401 when 
connection (any connection) is the regressor, while the p-value is 0.2581 when first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection are independent variables. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the connection variables are exogenous.   
5.5.2 Alternative indicators for reference points 
In order to fully compare the impact of social connection with psychological anchoring effect, 
we also include target peak price over various horizons as alternative indicators for target 
reference points.  Following Baker et al. (2012), we adopt target 13-week high, 26-week high, 
39-week high and 104-week high as alternative reference points. Similar to target 52-week 
high, X-week high is calculated as the log percentage difference of the target’s X-week high 
share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement. 
[Insert Table 11 About Here] 
Table 11 represents the multivariate analysis with alternative reference points. We divide the 
full sample into three quantiles (low, medium, high) based on various target reference points 
and then test the relation between connection and premium in the subsample of low/high 
target reference points. We observe that first-degree connection exerts a strong and negative 
effect on offer premium in the high quantile of alternative reference points, while no 
significant relation is found in the low quantile. The findings are consistent with the results 
with target 52-week high as the reference point (Table 5) and confirm that the negative effect 
of first-degree connection is more pronounced in the high quantile of reference points. By 
anchoring high reference points (peak price of target firms), bidders are more likely to pay 
higher premiums and more likely to deviate from target true value. Acquirers with a first-
degree connection have better access to target true value and better bargaining power in the 
negotiation; therefore, they pay reasonable lower offer prices, especially in deals with higher 
target reference points. Considering all analyses, the evidence shows that connection plays a 
determining role in pricing target firms and negotiating premiums.  
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5.5.3 Propensity score matching 
In this section, we employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method to reduce the 
potential selection bias. Propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) is a 
statistical method to estimate the treatment effects and reduce bias in non-randomised 
observational studies.17 In PSM, the treatment group is matched with the control group, 
which is not assigned to the certain condition but has similar characteristics and similar values 
of propensity score as the treatment group. Herein, we adopt propensity score matching (PSM) 
to evaluate the connection effect in premiums. The treatment group is the sample of 
connected deals or deals with first-degree connection, while the control group (untreated or 
comparison group) is the group of deals with no social ties but with similar corporate 
fundamentals and deal characteristics. Specifically, we adopt Nearest Neighbor (NN) 
matching as the matching algorithm to obtain the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
(Imbens, 2004).18 ATT compares the outcome between treated and untreated units in the 
matched sample. In this paper, the ATT measures the difference in premiums between 
connected deals and a comparable non-connected sample which has similar values of 
propensity score.  
[Insert Table 12 About Here] 
Table 12 shows the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for connected deals and 
comparison groups. Moreover, we apply the bootstrap method to estimate the standard error 
and confidence interval. In Panel 1a and Panel 1b, the treatment group is the deals in which 
acquirers are socially tied with targets. The control group in Panel 1a and Panel 1b is the 
group of matched non-connected deals with similar firm deal characteristics. The difference 
between Panel 1a and Panel 1b is whether to include the target reference point in the baseline 
characteristics. Panel 2a and Panel 2b show the impact of first-degree connection on 
acquisition premium. Likewise, we consider the target reference point – target 52-week high 
– as one covariate variable to calculate the propensity score for the control group in Panel 2b. 
Panel 1a shows the premium in the treatment group is 20.3% less (significant at the 10% 
                                                     
17 Treatment effects refer to the effect of a particular condition, such as policy, smoke, education, etc. The treatment group is the group 
which is assigned the condition. 
18 As a robustness check, we also adopt Stratifying matching and Kernel matching as matching algorithms to compute ATT and find 
similar results.   
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level) than the premium in the control group, while the premium difference is insignificant 
in Panel 1b. In Panel 2a and Panel 2b, ATT is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The premium in the treatment group is 15.3%, significantly less than the premium in 
the comparison group in Panel 2a, while the difference of premium is larger, at 25.3% 
between the treated and untreated groups in Panel 2b. The findings suggest that first-degree 
connection exerts a strong and negative influence in premium even after controlling target 
reference point as a baseline characteristic. The results with propensity score matching 
further support our previous finding that connection, especially first-degree connection, 
largely reduces acquisition premiums. The negative effect of first-degree connection is not 
affected by the psychological reference points. 
 
6. Conclusion 
With a US sample from 2001 to 2016, we focus on the influence of cross-firm social 
connections on acquisition premium during takeover activities. Our findings support the view 
that bidding firms socially connected to targets pay lower acquisition premiums. The savings 
in premiums would be larger when the two merging firms share the same board members or 
executives (that is, a first-degree social connection). To disentangle whether social 
connections are more related to better information flow or a familiarity bias, we introduce 
reference point theory (Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework. Acquirers in 
first-degree connected deals would rely more on information advantages to value the target, 
rather than the reference point – target 52-week high. Moreover, connected directors who are 
invited to participate in the new board of the new firm have stronger personal incentives to 
compromise on low acquisition premiums, at the cost of target shareholders’ interest. After 
reclassifying social connection into CEO connection, we find that bid premiums are largely 
reduced when either the target or acquirer CEO links the two merging firms. The results 
indicate that CEO connection is more efficient and valuable than board connection in 
affecting takeover activities. 
Further, favourable acquisition timing and payment method for acquirers could partially 
explain the negative relation between social connection and acquisition premium. We identify 
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that acquirers in connected deals tend to take over targets when their own stocks are highly 
valued and when the recent target price is far less than the target’s highest price over the 
previous year. Therefore, acquirers are prone to finance acquisitions with equity, due to 
overvalued stocks. 
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Figure 1: Histogram of difference between acquisition premium and target reference point 
 
Figure 1 presents the density of offer premium relative to target reference point. Following Baker et al. (2012), we adopt peak price of target firms over different horizons (13 
weeks, 26 weeks, 39 weeks, 52 weeks and 104 weeks). X-week high is calculated as the log percentage difference of the target's X-week high share price over the share price 
four weeks before the M&A deal announcement. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price and the target’s share price four 
weeks before the deal announcement. Each histogram plots the density of the difference between premium and target reference point. 
 
Histogram A: Target 13-week high                               Histogram B: Target 26-week high                               Histogram C: Target 39-week high 
                            
 
Histogram D: Target 52-week high                                                             Histogram E: Target 104-week high 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 illustrates our complete sample of 1,502 US M&A deals by year and industry of the acquiring 
company. Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 12-industry categories. Hereby, we 
classify our sample by the acquirer’s SIC code. We consider deals where acquirer and target are quoted 
US companies. The full sample is displayed first, followed by the classification of connected or non-
connected deals. A connected deal can be based on a first- or second-degree connection. A non-connected 
deal shows no evidence of any social connection. For each classification, we first report the number of 
deals per year followed by the number of deals per year by the total number of deals. This is done for 
each classification separately, and the ratio is reported as a percentage. 
 
Panel A: Deals per Year 
Year  
Full sample  Connected deals  Non-connected deals  
Numbe
r  
Percentag
e   
Numbe
r  
Percentag
e   
Numbe
r  
Percentag
e  
2001 144 9.59% 14 6.14% 130 10.20% 
2002 88 5.86% 11 4.82% 77 6.04% 
2003 124 8.26% 13 5.70% 111 8.71% 
2004 120 7.99% 8 3.51% 112 8.79% 
2005 102 6.79% 12 5.26% 90 7.06% 
2006 107 7.12% 9 3.95% 98 7.69% 
2007 93 6.19% 16 7.02% 77 6.04% 
2008 73 4.86% 10 4.39% 63 4.95% 
2009 63 4.19% 13 5.70% 50 3.92% 
2010 73 4.86% 9 3.95% 64 5.02% 
2011 46 3.06% 8 3.51% 38 2.98% 
2012 36 2.40% 3 1.32% 33 2.59% 
2013 97 6.46% 27 11.84% 70 5.49% 
2014 122 8.12% 23 10.09% 99 7.77% 
2015 141 9.39% 34 14.91% 107 8.40% 
2016 73 4.86% 18 7.89% 55 4.32% 
Total  1502 100.00% 228 100.00% 1274 100.00% 
       
Panel B: Deals per Industry 
Fama-French industry 
classification (12) 
Full sample  Connected deals  Non-connected deals  
Numbe
r  
Percentag
e   
Numbe
r  
Percentag
e  
Numbe
r  
Percentag
e  
Consumer NonDurables  40 2.66% 4 1.75% 36 2.83% 
Consumer Durables  14 0.93% 3 1.32% 11 0.86% 
Manufacturing  71 4.73% 16 7.02% 55 4.32% 
Energy, Oil, Gas and Coal 61 4.06% 16 7.02% 45 3.53% 
Chemicals  21 1.40% 6 2.63% 15 1.18% 
Business Equipment  361 24.03% 58 25.44% 303 23.78% 
Telephone and Television  40 2.66% 5 2.19% 35 2.75% 
Utilities  38 2.53% 16 7.02% 22 1.73% 
Wholesale and Retail  61 4.06% 9 3.95% 52 4.08% 
Healthcare and Med. 
Equip 180 11.98% 27 11.84% 153 12.01% 
Finance 516 34.35% 52 22.81% 464 36.42% 
Other 99 6.59% 16 7.02% 83 6.51% 
Total  1502 100.00% 228 100.00% 1274 100.00% 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our complete sample of 1,502 US M&A transactions between 2001 and 2016. We restrict the M&A deals by the following criteria: 
We only consider completed M&A deals where both acquirer and target are quoted companies with a deal value of at least $10 million and where the acquirer obtained more 
than 50% ownership of the target. Furthermore, the data for both the acquirer and target companies need to be available from CRSP and COMPUSTAT. We break down our 
variables into three panels: Panel A reports acquirer related firm characteristics, Panel B reports target related firm characteristics and Panel C reports common deal related 
characteristics. First, we present the values for the full sample. Next, we sub-divide our sample based on the presence and degree of social connections. For brevity, we include 
the CEO when mentioning the board of directors. A connection is present if at least one director from the acquiring firm has a first- or second-degree connection with at least 
one of the directors from the target firm. A first-degree connection, also known as board interlocks, happens if a director serves simultaneously on the acquirer’s and target’s 
boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree connection requires a social tie between two directors at the deal announcement of acquirer and target, 
respectively. This connection may be formed through any historical path, for instance employment, education or social clubs. The remaining deals are defined as non-connected 
M&A transactions. All denoted variables are specifically defined in Appendix A. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the difference of variable in means between connected 
and non-connected deals. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Variables 
Full sample (І) Connected deals  (ΙΙ) Unconnected deals (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ) - (ΙΙΙ) 
Mean  Standard deviation Mean  Standard deviation  Mean  Standard deviation  Difference 
Panel A: Acquirer related                
Tobin's Q  3.2583 11.5772 4.0544 12.0221 3.1164 11.4960 0.9381** 
Market Value ($millions)  19835.39 45473.69 23400.81 46778.20 19213.38 45233.45 4187.44*** 
Leverage  0.3830 0.2927 0.3983 0.2958 0.3803 0.2922 0.0180  
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0256 0.1571 0.0377 0.1069 0.0235 0.1645 0.0143** 
Acquirer run-up 0.0973 0.3524 0.1622 0.3960 0.0888 0.3441 0.0734** 
Panel B: Target related                
Tobin's Q  2.7862 9.2032 2.6921 5.9876 2.8033 9.6739 -0.1112* 
Market Value ($millions)  1664.18 5069.07 2848.98 6467.88 1454.79 4752.40 1394.20*** 
Leverage  37.48% 1.1145 36.89% 0.3382 37.59% 1.2009 -0.70% 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.0890 1.4583 -0.0233 0.2091 -0.1007996 1.5813 7.75%* 
Target run-up 0.1036 1.6957 0.0807 0.5147 0.1078 1.8291 -0.0271 
Panel C: Deal related               
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Transaction value ($millions)  2,148.43 6,328.85 3,537.58 8,139.58 1,899.04 5,915.28 1638.55*** 
Premium (%) 39.22% 0.3380 33.68% 0.2910 40.21% 0.3449 -6.53%*** 
Time to resolution (in days) 130.1262 79.2904 145.2061 101.9994 127.4189 74.2111 17.7872*** 
52-week high (%)  63.44% 2.2929 46.57% 0.9865 66.42% 2.4516 -19.85% 
Relative deal size  0.3333 0.4692 0.4153 0.6166 0.3213 0.4373 0.0940*** 
Hostile takeover 1.07% 0.0107 0.88% 0.0935 1.10% 0.1045 -0.23% 
Competing bid 4.14% 0.1993 4.39% 0.2052 4.09% 0.1982 0.29% 
Pure cash deal  39.45% 0.4889 35.09% 0.4783 40.24% 0.4906 -5.15% 
Pure stock deal  24.49% 0.4302 31.58% 0.4659 23.20% 0.4223 8.38%*** 
Diversification 29.37% 0.4556 27.19% 0.4459 29.76% 0.4574 -2.57% 
Tender offer  17.82% 0.3828 18.86% 0.3920 17.64% 0.3813 1.22% 
Number of observations 1502 228 1274   
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Table 3 – Correlation matrix 
 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix and shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for each pair of variables in this study. All denoted variables are specifically defined in 
Appendix A. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Correlation Matrix Premium First-degree Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
First-degree 
CEO 
Connection 
Second-degree 
CEO Connection 
First-degree 
Board 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Board 
Connection 
Target 52-
week high 
First-Degree Connection -0.0947***        
Second-Degree Connection -0.0146 -0.0799***       
First-degree CEO 
Connection -0.0916*** 0.7511*** -0.0386 
     
Second-degree CEO 
Connection -0.0504* 0.0698*** 0.4907*** -0.0354 
    
First-degree Board 
Connection -0.0440* 0.7396*** -0.0480* 0.3302*** 0.1137*** 
   
Second-degree Board 
Connection 0.0128 -0.012 0.8235*** 0.0157 0.0468* -0.0522** 
  
Target 52-week high 0.1190*** 0.0069 -0.0488* -0.001 -0.0228 0.0104 -0.0331  
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0231 -0.0034 0.0245 -0.0031 -0.0081 -0.0066 0.0304 0.0145 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0234 0.0108 -0.0092 0.0012 0.0029 0.0128 -0.0082 0.0186 
Transaction Value -0.1433*** -0.0161 0.2295*** -0.0232 0.1379*** -0.0079 0.1861*** -0.1546*** 
Relative Deal Size -0.1493*** -0.0009 0.0906*** 0.0001 0.0518* 0.0112 0.0634** 0.006 
Pure Cash Deal 0.1590*** -0.0283 -0.0462* -0.0292 -0.0694*** -0.0287 -0.0219 -0.0483 
Pure Stock Deal -0.1122*** 0.0796*** 0.0278 0.0927*** 0.1103*** 0.0529** -0.0026 0.1024*** 
Hostile 0.0521* 0.0114 -0.0211 -0.017 0.0089 0.0261 -0.0128 0.0231 
Tender 0.1523*** 0.0188 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0333 0.0294 0.0259 0.0647** 
Competing Bid 0.0566** -0.0089 0.0088 -0.0129 0.0037 -0.0107 0.0093 0.0147 
Diversification 0.0076 0.0154 -0.0329 0.0326 -0.0261 0.0136 -0.0135 -0.0254 
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Correlation Matrix Acquirer Tobin's Q  
Acquirer 
Run-up 
Target 
Tobin's Q  
Transaction 
Value 
Relative 
Deal Size 
Pure Cash 
Deal 
Pure Stock 
Deal Hostile Tender 
Competing 
Bid 
Target Tobin's Q  0.0376 -0.0063         
Transaction Value 0.0578** 0.0464 0.1016***        
Relative Deal Size -0.0183 0.0170 -0.0202 0.2478***       
Pure Cash Deal 0.0356 -0.0863*** 0.0287 -0.0698*** -0.2967***      
Pure Stock Deal 0.0011 0.0814***  -0.0217 -0.0998*** 0.0992*** -0.4597***     
Hostile -0.0076 -0.0174 -0.0278 -0.0013 0.0131 0.0011 -0.0263    
Tender 0.03 -0.0222 0.0193 0.0112 -0.1441*** 0.3560*** -0.2060*** 0.1722***   
Competing Bid -0.0209 0.0254 0.0007 0.1068*** 0.0511* 0.0383 -0.0564* 0.1088*** 0.1309***  
Diversification -0.0119 0.0041 -0.0186 0.0369 -0.0647** 0.1636*** -0.0805*** 0.0043 0.0405 -0.0089 
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Table 4 – Acquisition Premium Analysis and Reference Point 
Table 4 compares the impact of social connections and reference point hypothesis on acquisition premiums. Depending on the degree of our calculated 52-week high variables, 
we divide our sample into three quantiles (low, medium, high). Next, we present the values for the full sample and sub-divide our sample based on the presence and degree of 
social connections. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal 
announcement. According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is computed as the log percentage difference between the 52-week high share price and the target’s share 
price four weeks before the deal announcement. A connection is present if the acquirer’s directors form a first- or second-degree social connection with the target’s directors. 
A first-degree connection, also known as board interlocks, is considered if a director simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the announcement of the 
M&A deal. A second-degree connection requires a social tie between two directors from both target and acquiring firms at the deal announcement, respectively. The remaining 
deals are defined as non-connected M&A transactions. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the difference of premium between pair-wise groups. ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Premium 
Full Sample  Connected deals 
First-degree 
connected 
Second-degree 
connected 
Non-connected 
deals  Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) - (5) (3) - (5) (4) - (5) (3) - (4) 
52-Week high                   
Low 30.16% 27.66% 15.40% 30.61% 30.60% -2.94% -15.20%*** 0.01% -15.21%** 
Medium 35.19% 28.90% 25.80% 30.31% 36.29% -7.39%** -10.49%*** -5.98% -4.51%* 
High 51.49% 42.49% 36.85% 46.44% 53.10% -10.61%** -16.25%*** -6.66% -9.59%* 
                    
Observations 1502 228 66 162 1274         
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Table 5 – Determinants of the acquisition premium 
 
Table 5 reports the multivariate analysis for acquisition premium. In all models, acquisition premium is 
regressed against a dummy variable indicating whether the acquirer and target firms are socially 
connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price 
and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. Further, we differentiate between 
first- and second-degree connections. The independent variable in Model 1 and Model 4 is Connection, 
which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with targets. The independent variable in Model 
3 is target 52-week high, log percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high share price to evaluate 
the anchoring effect. The independent variables in Model 2 and Model 5 are first-degree connection and 
second-degree connection. A first-degree connection happens if a director simultaneously serves on the 
acquirer’s and target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree connection 
requires a social tie between a director from the acquirer’s board and a director from the target’s board. 
This connection may be formed through any historical path, for instance employment, education or social 
clubs. Furthermore, we use the log percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high share price from 
Baker et al. (2012) in Model 4 and Model 5. In addition, we control for different acquirer, target and 
deal-related characteristics. In all models, we control for industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, we 
do not report the results for the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables 
defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Connection -0.2724***   -0.2691***  
 (-2.67) 
  (-2.64)  
First-degree connection  -0.4072***   -0.4045*** 
 
 (-2.72)   (-2.64) 
Second-degree connection   0.0213   0.0227 
 
 (0.29)   (0.29) 
Target 52-week high    0.0386*** 0.0145 0.0212 
 
  (3.19) (1.01) (1.30) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 (-0.29) (0.58) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.06) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0044 -0.0035*** -0.0033 -0.0043 -0.0034** 
 (-1.39) (-2.64) (-1.24) (-1.36) (-2.45) 
Relative deal size  -0.1659* -0.1386** -0.1564** -0.1663* -0.1516** 
 (-1.91) (-2.25) (-2.50) (-1.92) (-2.38) 
Pure cash deal  0.0683 0.1495** 0.1280** 0.0757 0.1551** 
 (0.86) (2.42) (2.00) (0.94) (2.48) 
Hostile takeover -0.7180 0.4038 0.4475* -0.7059 0.4285 
 (-1.41) (1.43) (1.69) (-1.37) (1.63) 
Tender offer  -0.0060 0.0734 0.0976 -0.0027 0.0661 
 (-0.06) (1.03) (1.24) (-0.03) (0.90) 
Competing bid 0.0160 0.1297 0.1037 0.0113 0.1136 
 (0.10) (0.99) (0.85) (0.07) (0.85) 
Diversification -0.0355 -0.0204 -0.0291 -0.0327 -0.0152 
 (-0.48) (-0.36) (-0.48) (-0.44) (-0.26) 
Constant -0.8775*** -1.0568*** -1.2695*** -0.9091*** -1.0876*** 
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 (-3.86) (-10.40) (-8.95) (-3.96) (-10.23) 
 
  
 
  
Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.089 0.068 0.085 0.087 
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Table 6 – Acquisition premium analysis in subsamples of low/high target 52-week high 
Table 6 reports the multivariate analysis for acquisition premium in subsamples of low/high target 52-
week high. Target 52-week high is the target's 52-week high share price, computed as log percentage 
difference of the target’s share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement. The full sample is 
split into three groups based on the target 52-week high. The low group in Model 1 and Model 3 refers 
to the subsample in which the deals have the lowest target 52-week high, while the high group in Model 
2 and Model 4 is the subsample in which the deals have the highest target 52-week high. In all models, 
acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable indicating if the acquirer and target firms are 
socially connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer 
price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. Further, we differentiate 
between first- and second-degree connections. The independent variable in Model 1 and Model 2 is 
Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with targets. The dependent 
variables in Model 3 and Model 4 are first-degree connection and second-degree connection. A first-
degree connection happens if a director simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the 
announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree connection requires a social tie between a director 
from the acquirer’s board and a director from the target’s board. This connection may be formed through 
any historical path, for instance employment, education or social clubs. In addition, we control for 
different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all models, we control for industry and year 
fixed effects. For brevity, we do not report the results for the industry and year dummies. All models 
contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Acquisition premium Low  High  Low  High  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
Connection 0.0521 -0.1958**   
 (0.50) (-2.14) 
  
First-degree connection   -0.5089 -0.3937*** 
 
  (-1.36) (-3.31) 
Second-degree connection    0.1676 -0.0594 
 
  (1.55) (-0.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0064 -0.0016* 0.0056 -0.0017* 
 (1.03) (-1.74) (0.91) (-1.85) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0013 -0.0058*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** 
 (-1.03) (-2.85) (-1.05) (-2.67) 
Relative deal size  -0.1918** -0.0864 -0.2062** -0.0992 
 (-2.13) (-0.95) (-2.30) (-1.12) 
Pure cash deal  0.1178 0.1493* 0.1338 0.1523* 
 (1.14) (1.79) (1.34) (1.84) 
Hostile takeover 0.5269 0.3415* 0.5358 0.3542* 
 (1.43) (1.74) (1.49) (1.78) 
Tender offer -0.0566 0.1132 -0.0684 0.1148 
 (-0.46) (1.25) (-0.57) (1.26) 
Competing bid 0.2631 -0.0490 0.2967* -0.0563 
 (1.53) (-0.26) (1.71) (-0.30) 
Diversification -0.0210 -0.0601 -0.0227 -0.0634 
 (-0.24) (-0.76) (-0.26) (-0.80) 
Constant -0.8192*** -0.5186** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** 
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 (-3.58) (-2.49) (-3.68) (-2.59) 
      
Year-fixed-effects yes yes Yes yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  yes yes Yes yes 
Observations 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.075 0.067 0.078 
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Table 7 – Explain low premium for connected deals 
 
Table 7 explores why acquisition premium is associated with social connection using three panels. Panel A shows univariate analysis for low premium in the connected deals, 
first-degree connected deals and second-degree connected deals, which are further classified by directors’ position on the board of acquisition partners. We divide board position 
into first-level (CEO; Chairman) and second-level (common director; independent director). A_higher position refers to interlocking directors with a higher position in the 
acquirer board than the target board. A_same level position is where an interlocking director is CEO/Chairman of both acquirer and target, or is hired as a common director or 
independent director of the acquisition partner. T_higher position indicates that an interlocking director has a higher position (CEO/Chairman) in the acquirer than the target. 
Panel B limits the sample to second-degree connected deals. In Panel B, we classify the sample by whether a target director is retained on the board of the combined firm after 
acquisition. Panel C lists multivariate analysis for low premium. Model 1 and Model 2 report regressions for deals with a connection. Model 3 and Model 4 show the results of 
first-degree connection. The dependent variables in all the models are acquisition premium, computed as the log percentage difference between offer price and the target’s share 
price four weeks before the deal announcement. A_higher position is a dummy variable which equals one when interlocking directors have a higher board position in the 
acquirer than the target, and zero otherwise. A_same position is a dummy variable which equals one when an interlocking director has the same level position in the acquirer 
as in the target, and zero otherwise. In Model 5 and Model 6, the independent variable is T_retain, a dummy variable which equals one when a target director is offered a board 
seat on the board of the combined firm. Model 2, Model 4 and Model 6 control both year and industry fixed-effects. For brevity, we do not report the results for the industry 
and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the difference of premium between pair-
wise groups in Panel A and Panel B. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Premium for Seniority 
  Connected deal  A_higher position A_T same level  T_higher position Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (4) (3) - (4) (2) - (3) 
Premium  33.68% 27.88% 34.78% 39.36% -11.48%** -4.58%* -6.90% 
Observations 228 34 142 52       
  First-degree connected A_higher position A_T same level  T_higher position Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (4) (3) - (4) (2) - (3) 
Premium  28.88% 13.17% 28.20% 46.94% -19.06%*** -6.18%** -15.04%** 
Observations 66 22 32 12       
  Second-degree connected A_higher position A_T same level  T_higher position Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (4) (3) - (4) (2) - (3) 
Premium  35.64% 29.36% 37.29% 35.91% -6.54% -1.39% -6.54% 
Observations 162 12 110 40       
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Panel B: Univariate analysis of Premium for retention  
  Connected deal Retain Non-retain Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) 
premium  33.68% 30.12% 40.07% -9.95%*** 
Observations 228 120 108   
  Second-degree connected Retain Non-retain Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) 
premium  35.64% 31.46% 37.73% -6.26%** 
Observations 162 54 108   
 
 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis of Premium for seniority and retention 
Acquisition Premium 
Connected  First-degree Connected Connected  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
    
  
A_higher position -0.1674*** -0.1678*** -0.3060*** -0.4775***   
 (-3.29) (-2.97) (-3.68) (-3.74)   
A_T same level position -0.0528* -0.0508 -0.1233* -0.3695***   
 (-1.67) (-1.61) (-1.77) (-3.22)   
T_Retain     -0.1040*** -0.0959*** 
 
    (-3.38) (-2.99) 
Target 52-week high  0.0185*** 0.0114 0.0246 0.0003 0.0180*** 0.0106 
 (2.65) (1.61) (0.63) (0.00) (2.58) (1.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0132 0.0500** -0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.32) (-0.20) (1.51) (2.89) (-0.00) (0.01) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0021** -0.0026*** 0.0006 -0.0235** -0.0024** -0.0029*** 
 (-2.04) (-2.66) (0.09) (-2.24) (-2.29) (-3.03) 
Relative deal size  -0.0530*** -0.0608*** -0.3180*** -0.4711** -0.0517** -0.0608*** 
 (-2.66) (-2.77) (-3.01) (-2.95) (-2.41) (-2.60) 
Pure cash deal  0.0853*** 0.0729*** -0.1019* -0.1426 0.0845*** 0.0743*** 
 (3.79) (2.98) (-1.74) (-1.75) (3.72) (3.04) 
Hostile takeover 0.0330 0.0393 0.1756 0.1928 0.0439 0.0474 
 (0.31) (0.36) (1.03) (0.77) (0.42) (0.44) 
Tender offer  0.1096*** 0.0517 0.2555*** 0.1872* 0.1035*** 0.0448 
 (3.46) (1.63) (3.62) (1.95) (3.29) (1.42) 
Competing bid 0.1237** 0.1271** 0.1810 0.3978** 0.1237** 0.1264** 
 (2.24) (2.23) (1.67) (2.46) (2.24) (2.22) 
Diversification -0.0238 -0.0198 -0.1044* -0.0783 -0.0242 -0.0218 
 (-1.12) (-0.91) (-1.85) (-1.05) (-1.13) (-1.00) 
Constant 0.3666*** 0.5532*** 0.4198*** 0.0355 0.3671*** 0.5570*** 
 (20.63) (7.80) (5.49) (0.12) (20.26) (7.94) 
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 228 228 66 66 228 228 
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.120 0.361 0.466 0.080 0.123 
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Table 8 - Determinants of acquisition premium in CEO connections 
 
In Table 8, we analyse the acquisition premium by adopting an alternative proxy – CEO connection. In all models, acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable 
indicating if the acquirer and target firms are socially connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between the offer price and the target’s 
share price four weeks before the deal announcement. The independent variable in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 5 is CEO Connection, which is equal to one if either the 
acquirer or target CEO connects the two merging firms. The dependent variables in Model 3, Model 4 and Model 6 are CEO first-degree connection and CEO second-degree 
connection. CEO first-degree connection is defined as when acquirer CEOs also work as target board members (acquirer board member) or executives. CEO second-degree 
connection happens when acquirer or target CEOs share past experience with board members or executives in the counterpart firm. Furthermore, we use the log percentage 
difference of the target’s 52-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) in Model 2 and Model 4. In addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-related 
characteristics. In all models, we control for industry and year fixed effects. In Model 5 and Model 6, we split the full sample into three groups (low, medium, high) based on 
the target 52-week high and show the multivariate analysis of premiums in the low/high target 52-week high subsample. For brevity, we do not report the results for the industry 
and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Low High Low High 
         
CEO Connection -0.2891** -0.3117**   -0.1400 -0.4563***   
 (-2.50) (-2.56) 
  (-0.59) (-3.66)   
First-degree CEO connection   -0.5075** -0.5704***   -0.8295 -0.5370*** 
 
  (-2.39) (-2.60)   (-1.64) (-3.26) 
Second-degree CEO connection    -0.1266 -0.1317   0.2476 -0.3992** 
 
  (-1.10) (-1.11)   (1.48) (-2.24) 
Target 52-week high   0.0197  0.0210     
 
 (1.22)  (1.29)     
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0004 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0057 -0.0017* 0.0071 -0.0017* 
 (0.40) (-0.33) (0.45) (-0.07) (0.93) (-1.94) (1.15) (-1.91) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0037*** -0.0035** -0.0036*** -0.0034** -0.0012 -0.0051*** -0.0012 -0.0051*** 
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 (-2.67) (-2.47) (-2.68) (-2.42) (-0.99) (-2.65) (-0.97) (-2.62) 
Relative deal size  -0.1463** -0.1580** -0.1489** -0.1514** -0.1925** -0.0940 -0.1912** -0.0930 
 (-2.32) (-2.44) (-2.35) (-2.38) (-2.13) (-1.15) (-2.10) (-1.10) 
Pure cash deal  0.1326** 0.1369** 0.1329** 0.1519** 0.1120 0.1541* 0.1334 0.1640** 
 (2.15) (2.19) (2.16) (2.44) (1.08) (1.91) (1.35) (2.01) 
Hostile takeover 0.4067** 0.4309** 0.3906** 0.3999** 0.5213 0.3549* 0.4721 0.3274* 
 (2.26) (2.45) (2.18) (2.52) (1.29) (1.80) (1.34) (1.67) 
Tender offer  0.0528 0.0466 0.0577 0.0686 -0.0675 0.1173 -0.0263 0.1317 
 (0.75) (0.63) (0.81) (0.94) (-0.57) (1.24) (-0.22) (1.45) 
Competing bid 0.1162 0.0997 0.1206 0.1162 0.2703 -0.0464 0.3573** -0.0632 
 (0.89) (0.75) (0.92) (0.87) (1.57) (-0.25) (1.98) (-0.34) 
Diversification -0.0182 -0.0152 -0.0185 -0.0151 -0.0210 -0.0591 -0.0180 -0.0635 
 (-0.29) (-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.70) (-0.21) (-0.80) 
Constant -0.6736*** -0.7101*** -0.6793*** -1.0902*** -0.8130*** -0.5437*** -1.1661*** -0.9619*** 
 (-4.54) (-4.62) (-4.58) (-10.30) (-3.45) (-2.71) (-7.18) (-6.84) 
         
         
Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.092 0.095 0.090 0.055 0.086 0.072 0.080 
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Table 9 – Method of Payment 
Table 9 reports the logit regression on the method of payment. The dependent variable in all models is 
the Stock dummy, which is equal to one if the takeover transaction is fully financed with stock. The 
independent variable in Model 1 and Model 2 is Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are 
socially connected with targets. The dependent variable in Model 3 and Model 4 is first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection happens if a director simultaneously 
serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree 
connection requires a social tie between a director from the acquirer’s board and a director from the 
target’s board. This connection may be formed through any historical path, for instance employment, 
education or social clubs. Further, we control for different acquirer and deal-related characteristics, as 
well as for industry and year fixed effects in Model 2 and Model 4. For brevity, we do not report the 
results for the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in 
Appendix A.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Stock as payment method Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Connection 0.6800*** 0.7955***   
 (3.55) (3.90) 
  
First-degree connection   0.8667*** 0.8662*** 
 
  (2.79) (2.77) 
Second-degree connection    0.5829** 0.7159*** 
 
  (2.50) (2.87) 
Target 52-week high  0.0900* 0.1160* 0.0894* 0.1047* 
 (1.71) (1.82) (1.71) (1.69) 
Acquirer stock run-up 0.5428*** 0.5018*** 0.5371*** 0.4179** 
 (2.88) (2.61) (2.82) (2.13) 
Acquirer firm size -0.2479*** -0.2103*** -0.2449*** -0.2100*** 
 (-5.76) (-4.57) (-5.70) (-4.56) 
Relative deal size  -0.0674 0.0291 -0.0565 -0.0038 
 (-0.49) (0.20) (-0.41) (-0.02) 
Hostile takeover 0.4920 0.3960 0.4766 0.3295 
 (0.57) (0.47) (0.56) (0.39) 
Tender offer  -1.7878*** -1.5877*** -1.7903*** -1.6023*** 
 (-5.84) (-5.18) (-5.84) (-5.25) 
Competing bid -0.4711 -0.4259 -0.4800 -0.4758 
 (-1.10) (-0.97) (-1.12) (-1.10) 
Diversification -0.2404 -0.1664 -0.2423 -0.1235 
 (-1.47) (-0.99) (-1.48) (-0.73) 
Constant 0.8776** -0.1185 0.8538** 0.0301 
 (2.47) (-0.12) (2.40) (0.03) 
     
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.136 0.107 0.142 
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Table 10 –Endogeneity test 
 
Table 10 reports the endogeneity test – two stages least square (2sls) – for acquisition premium analysis. The instrument variable for social connection is previous social 
connection, which refers to a situation where acquirers and targets are socially connected three years before the takeover announcement. Similarly, the instrument variable for 
first-degree connection is previous first-degree connection, which describes whether a director simultaneously served on the acquirer’s and target’s boards three years before 
the announcement of the M&A deal. The instrument variable for second-degree connection is previous second-degree connection, which describes whether two individual 
board members, respectively from the acquirer and target, had social ties three years before the deal announcement. This connection may be formed through any historical path, 
for instance employment, education or social clubs. In all models, acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable indicating if the acquirer and target firms are 
socially connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal 
announcement. Furthermore, we use the percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) as a measure of potential overpayment. In 
addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all models, we control for industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, we do not report the 
results for the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Acquisition Premium 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
Connection Connection First-degree Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
First-degree 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
           
Connection   -0.1648*  -0.1693*       
  (-1.72) 
 (-1.79)       
First-degree connection   
  
  -0.4502**   -0.4525** 
   
  
  (-2.14)   (-2.42) 
Second-degree connection    
  
  -0.0268   -0.0222 
   
  
  (-0.27)   (-0.20) 
Target 52-week high    -0.0019 0.0192   
 0.0002 -0.0033** 0.0203 
   (-1.36) (1.12)   
 (0.31) (-2.44) (1.21) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0003* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 
 (-0.26) (0.43) (-1.68) (-0.07) (0.92) (-0.07) (0.28) (0.85) (-0.22) (-0.06) 
Target Tobin's Q  0.0000 -0.0038 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0035* 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0034* 
55 
 
 (0.20) (-1.36) (0.09) (-1.29) (0.68) (-0.94) (-1.92) (0.65) (-0.95) (-1.72) 
Relative deal size  0.0373 -0.1406* 0.0215 -0.1510** -0.0052 0.0441* -0.1486* -0.0066 0.0449* -0.1615*** 
 (1.41) (-1.82) (1.04) (-2.12) (-0.85) (1.69) (-1.85) (-1.05) (1.74) (-2.83) 
Pure cash deal  -0.0133 0.1273** -0.0183 0.1313** -0.0115 -0.0049 0.1324** -0.0122 -0.0063 0.1378** 
 (-0.80) (2.22) (-0.97) (2.30) (-1.46) (-0.29) (2.12) (-1.49) (-0.37) (2.28) 
Hostile takeover 0.0372 0.3982** 0.0276 0.4204** 0.0622 -0.0269 0.4196** 0.0624 -0.0338 0.4439** 
 (0.37) (2.21) (0.24) (2.51) (0.66) (-0.85) (2.12) (0.65) (-1.03) (2.54) 
Tender offer  0.0200 0.0611 0.0290 0.0550 0.0089 0.0146 0.0595 0.0091 0.0246 0.0522 
 (0.84) (0.86) (1.01) (0.93) (0.60) (0.57) (0.85) (0.60) (0.95) (0.82) 
Competing bid -0.0185 0.1131 -0.0327 0.0972 0.0187 -0.0327 0.1186 0.0177 -0.0321 0.1024 
 (-0.70) (0.92) (-1.09) (0.76) (0.73) (-1.21) (0.89) (0.68) (-1.17) (0.86) 
Diversification 0.0145 -0.0199 0.0152 -0.0153 0.0094 -0.0008 -0.0219 0.0098 0.0007 -0.0167 
 (0.87) (-0.49) (0.83) (-0.28) (1.05) (-0.05) (-0.34) (1.04) (0.04) (-0.36) 
Previous Connection (IV) 0.9319***  0.9329***        
 (77.07)  (62.50)        
Previous First-degree connection (IV)    0.9662*** -0.4137***  0.9625*** -0.4179***  
     (77.82) (-5.66)  (68.76) (-5.58)  
Previous Second-degree connection (IV)    0.0401 0.8052***  0.0438 0.7959***  
     (1.61)   (1.61) (24.07)  
Constant -0.0345 -0.6653*** -0.0022 -0.7011*** -0.0138 -0.0149 -0.6749*** -0.0001 0.0059 -0.7133*** 
 (-1.48) (-5.11) (-0.1) (-4.62) (-1.17) (-0.57) (-5.45) (-0.01) (0.29) (-4.48) 
           
Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Adjusted R2 0.655 0.087 0.6289 0.085 0.6433 0.5545 0.094 0.6354 0.5438 0.092 
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Table 11 – Alternative target reference points 
Table 11 reports the premium analysis with social connection and alternative target reference points. In Panel A, the acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable 
indicating if the acquirer and target firms are socially connected. The independent variable in Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 is first-degree connection. Furthermore, 
we use the log percentage difference of the target’s X-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) in all models. Panel B shows the multivariate regressions in the subsample 
of low/high target reference point. Target’s X-week high is computed as the log percentage difference between target peak price achieved during the past X weeks and target 
price four weeks before the deal announcement. The models include target 13-week high, target 26-week high, target 39-week high and target 104-week high as the target 
reference point in Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, respectively. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between the offer price and the 
target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. A first-degree connection happens if a director simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the 
announcement of the M&A deal. In addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics, as well as for industry and year fixed effects. All models 
contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Premium analysis in the subsamples of low/high target reference points 
Acquisition Premium 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
13-week high reference point 26-week high reference point 39-week high reference point 104-week high reference point 
Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
First-degree connection -0.5089 -0.3937*** -0.5089 -0.3937*** -0.5089 -0.3937*** -0.5089 -0.3937*** 
 (-1.36) (-3.31) (-1.36) (-3.31) (-1.36) (-3.31) (-1.36) (-3.31) 
Second-degree connection  0.1676 -0.0594 0.1676 -0.0594 0.1676 -0.0594 0.1676 -0.0594 
 (1.55) (-0.50) (1.55) (-0.50) (1.55) (-0.50) (1.55) (-0.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0056 -0.0017* 0.0056 -0.0017* 0.0056 -0.0017* 0.0056 -0.0017* 
 (0.91) (-1.85) (0.91) (-1.85) (0.91) (-1.85) (0.91) (-1.85) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0013 -0.0053*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** 
 (-1.05) (-2.67) (-1.05) (-2.67) (-1.05) (-2.67) (-1.05) (-2.67) 
Relative deal size  -0.2062** -0.0992 -0.2062** -0.0992 -0.2062** -0.0992 -0.2062** -0.0992 
 (-2.30) (-1.12) (-2.30) (-1.12) (-2.30) (-1.12) (-2.30) (-1.12) 
Pure stock deal  0.1338 0.1523* 0.1338 0.1523* 0.1338 0.1523* 0.1338 0.1523* 
 (1.34) (1.84) (1.34) (1.84) (1.34) (1.84) (1.34) (1.84) 
Hostile takeover 0.5358 0.3542* 0.5358 0.3542* 0.5358 0.3542* 0.5358 0.3542* 
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 (1.49) (1.78) (1.49) (1.78) (1.49) (1.78) (1.49) (1.78) 
Tender offer -0.0684 0.1148 -0.0684 0.1148 -0.0684 0.1148 -0.0684 0.1148 
 (-0.57) (1.26) (-0.57) (1.26) (-0.57) (1.26) (-0.57) (1.26) 
Competing bid 0.2967* -0.0563 0.2967* -0.0563 0.2967* -0.0563 0.2967* -0.0563 
 (1.71) (-0.30) (1.71) (-0.30) (1.71) (-0.30) (1.71) (-0.30) 
Diversification -0.0227 -0.0634 -0.0227 -0.0634 -0.0227 -0.0634 -0.0227 -0.0634 
 (-0.26) (-0.80) (-0.26) (-0.80) (-0.26) (-0.80) (-0.26) (-0.80) 
Constant -0.8404*** -0.5242*** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** 
 (-3.68) (-2.59) (-3.68) (-2.59) (-3.68) (-2.59) (-3.68) (-2.59) 
 
        
Year-fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.078 0.067 0.078 0.067 0.078 0.067 0.078 
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Table 12 – Propensity Score Matching  
 
Table 12 presents propensity score matching (PSM) analysis to estimate the social connection effect on premium. 
Bootstrap is applied to estimate the standard error and confidence interval. The average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) compares the outcome between treated and untreated groups in the matched sample. Nearest 
neighbour matching (NN) is adopted as the matching algorithm to compute ATT. In Panel 1a and Panel 1b, the 
treatment group is the deals in which acquirers and targets are socially connected. The control group in Panel 
1a is matched non-connected deals with similar baseline characteristics (excluding target 52-week high 
reference point). The control group in Panel 1b is matched non-connected deals with similar baseline 
characteristics (including target 52-week high reference point). Similarly, the treatment group in Panel 2a and 
Panel 2b is first-degree connected deals, while the control group is matched non-connected deals with same 
firm and deal characteristics (excluding target 52-week high reference point in the characteristics of the control 
group in Panel 2a; including target 52-week high reference point in Panel 2b). Robust t-statistics are reported 
in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel 1a: Connection effect    
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 166 Observation 142 -20.3%* 0.121 -1.668 
       
Panel 1b: Connection effect (target 52-week high in matching sample) 
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 153 Observation 135 -13.00% 0.100 -1.309 
       
Panel 2a: First-degree connection effect   
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 48 Observation 46 -15.3%*** 0.065 -3.142 
Panel 2b: First-degree connection effect (target 52-week high in matching sample) 
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 47 Observation 43 -25.3%*** 0.073 -3.447 
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Appendix A 
     
Variables  Definitions  Source  
Panel A: Dependent Variables  
Acquisition premium Premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from the target's share price 
four weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012).  
CRSP/SDC  
Panel B: Key Independent variables  
 Connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer and target share at least one 1st-degree or 2nd-degree 
connection. 
BoardEx 
1st-degree connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if a director (including CEO) serves on the acquirer’s and target's 
boards at the deal announcement. 
BoardEx 
2nd-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if a social tie between the respective CEOs or directors of merging 
companies is present at the deal announcement.  
BoardEx 
CEO connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if either acquirer or target CEO connects the two merging firms.  BoardEx 
CEO first-degree connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer CEO (target CEO) also serves as a target board member 
(acquirer board member) or manager. 
BoardEx 
CEO second-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer or target CEO share past experience with board members or 
executives in the counterpart firm.  
BoardEx 
Board connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if board members connect bidders with targets. BoardEx 
Board first-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if bidding firms and targets share the same board member.  BoardEx 
Board second-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals respectively from acquirer and target boards have 
social ties through past experience. 
BoardEx 
Higher level positions for Acquirer (Target) Dummy variable that equals 1 if an interlocking director holds a more important position in the 
acquirer (target) than in the target (acquirer), while the same level position indicates that directors 
hold the same level position in both firms. 
BoardEx 
T_retain Dummy variable that equals 1 if a target director is offered a board seat in the combined firm after 
acquisition.  
BoardEx 
Panel C: Firm characteristics  
60 
 
Tobin's Q (Q) In line with Masulis et al. (2007), we specify Tobin's Q as the ratio of market value by book value of 
the company's assets. 
COMPUSTAT  
Market Value (MV) The market value represents the size of the company. It is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the respective stock price at four weeks before the official deal 
announcement.  
CRSP  
Leverage The ratio of total debt by total assets. COMPUSTAT 
Return on Assets (ROA) We specify ROA as the ratio of the company's net income by the book value of total assets. COMPUSTAT 
Panel D: Deal characteristics  
Transaction value ($millions)  This variable accounts for the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer in order to obtain the 
target. We report the total dollar value as reported by SDC. 
SDC 
Relative deal size  This variable is computed as the transaction value divided by the market capitalisation of the acquirer, 
four weeks before the official deal announcement.  
SDC 
Hostile takeover Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal was reported as hostile. SDC 
Competing bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal involved more than one bid.  SDC 
Pure cash deal (Cash) Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal was paid entirely by cash. SDC 
Pure stock deal (Stock) Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal was paid entirely by stock. SDC 
52-week high (%)  Following Baker et al. (2012), we compute this variable as the log percentage difference of the 
target's 52-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal 
announcement.  
CRSP 
X-week high (%) Following Baker et al. (2012), we compute this variable as the log percentage difference of the 
target's X-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement.  
 
Stock Price run-up The buy-and-hold returns of bidding firms over the period from 200 trading days to two months 
before the announcement. 
CRSP 
 
